



The specific words "independent"and "indepen-
dence" do notappear in the Federal Reserve Act,
yettheyoften appear in descriptionsofthe Federal
Reserve's relationship to popularly elected gov-
ernment. Fromthe provisions ofthe Federal Re-
serve Act, and its legislative history, itis abundantly
clear that the Federal Reserve System is intended
to be insulated as far as possiblefrom the short-term
pressures ofpartisan politics, but it is just as clear
thatthe Fed is ultimatelyaccountabletoCongress.
This Weekly Letterdiscussesthe initial conceptsof
independence and accountabilitythatfound ex-
pression inthe Federal Reserve Act, and howthese
were tested and influenced by a numberofevents
in the System's1ormative years.
Early concepts
At the start, the Federal Reserve's "independence"
derived to an importantextentfrom its regional
structure and its initially limited menu of respon-
sibilities. To aconsiderableextent, decisionmaking
was decentralized underthe Federal Reserve Act,
which assigned the powerand authority of imple-
mentingthe System's goals tothe regional Reserve
Banks underthe general supervisory authority of
the Federal Reserve Board. The specific goals
included a more "elastic"currency, achieved by
providing a means for banks to borrow currency
and reserves from the Fed, and more effective
bank supervision.
However, early in the System's formative years,
several key events served to redefine the notion of
Fed independence. Atthe heart ofmany ofthese
events was the Secretary ofthe Treasury, who
served as ex officio member and Chairman ofthe
Board ofthe FederalReserve. Together with his
Treasury colleague and fellow Board member, the
Comptroller, he was in a position to exert consid-
erable influence. And Treasury Secretary (later
Senator) William McAdooofCalifornia was no
shrinkingviolet. Hepresided overanumberofkey
controversies that changed the nature and concept
of Fed independence, and that eventually led to
major changes in the System's structure.
Encounters of the first kind
One controversy involved the efforts, in 1915, of
Board members with strong "centralist" prefer-
ences to eliminatefour and potentially six ofthe
Reserve Banks-Kansas City, Minneapolis, Atlan-
ta, Dallas, Boston and Richmond. These members
included investment banker Paul Warburg, who
hadbeen hostiIe to some aspects ofthe Federal
Reserve Act butwho nevertheless was appointed
to the Board by President WiIson in an effortto
re-establish a spiritofcooperation with the finan-
cial community. In makingtheir case, the propo-
nents of reduction cited Warburg's dissatisfaction
with the "pettyframe ofmind resulting from a
twelve-headed system," butfocused primarilyon
the operating losses incurred by the Banks singled
outfor elimination in their first year ofoperation.
Treasury Secretary McAdoo strongly opposed the
move, as did afuriousCongressman Glass, author
oftheFederal Reserve Act. An irate, "decentralist"
President Wilson was prepared to remove the of-
fending Board members "forcause," despite his
prior reluctance to have any contact with Board
members on the grounds thatthe moment he did
so, "that moment I wouId be accused oftrying to
bring political pressure to bear." The Board backed
offwhen faced with an opinion from the Attorney
General that only the Congress could reduce the
numberof Reserve Banks, notwithstandingthe
language the Federal Reserve Act that indicated
there could be fewerthan twelve Reserve Banks.
On anotheroccasion, shortlyaftertheSystem was
operational, Treasury Secretary McAdoo recom-
mended that the Federal Reserve Board be sub-
jected to the congressional appropriations process.
This move was intended to eliminate the Board's
dependenceupon the Reserve Banks tofinance
its activities, and thereby to remove a potential
source of Reserve Bank influence on the Board.
Board memberW. G. Harding subsequently
claimed this was a ployto make the Board an
adjunctofthe Treasury. On sti II another occasion,
McAdoo recommended increasing the numberof
directors appointed by the Federal Reserve Board
on the boards ofeach Reserve Bank to a majority
in order to increase the influenceofthe Federal
Reserve Board over the Reserve Banks.
War finance-calling the shots
The Treasury Secretary's influence on the BoardFRBSF
was mostpronounced inmatters of"creditpolicy."
As one raconteur ofthe Fed's early years noted,
Fed officials at both the Board and the Reserve
Banks had littletimeto"crystallizetheirthinking"
on the Fed's role before the U.s. entered the first
World War inthe springof1917. Bythattime, most
countries had abandoned the gold standard be-
cause ofthe dislocations and financing require-
ments ofthe war.
One ofTreasury Secretary McAdoo's first acts in
this period was to pressure the Reserve Banks into
extending totheTreasury twotax.IoanstotaIIing
$300 million at interest rates oftwo and three
percent, respectively. WhenotherBoard members
and Reserve Banks balked at offeringthe Treasury
below-market rates, McAdoo threatened to take
overall the Reserve Banks' funds underthewartime
Overman Act, which authorized the President "to
make such redistribution offunctions amongex-
ecutive agencies as he may deem necessary."
McAdoo strongly objected to financing thewar at
market rates. Instead, he urged the Reserve Banks
to set their discount rates, at which they lentto
commercial banks, well belowthe coupon rates
on current government issues to encourage the
banksto borrowfrom the Fed and touse thefunds
to buy government securities.
The accommodation and faciIitation ofthe Trea-
sury's war financing requirements thus became
the primary objective of Fed policy duringWorld
War I. "Everythingelse," accordingtotheTreasury
Secretary, "was thrown into the background. The
Board necessarily was obliged to follow the poli-
cies oftheTreasury Department and the Govern-
ment." From America's entry into WWI through
mid-1919,thefederal debtsoared from alittleover
$1 billion to $25 billion.
Fed officials generally recognized that the rapid
expansion ofmoney and u.s. securities bought
through money creation to support the Treasury's
borrowing requirements were among the causes
ofsharply rising prices (consumer prices rose by
over 30 percent duringthe War), butthey differed
as to its importance. Many attributed most ofthe
increase to shortages ofbasic materials and com-
modities in the face of"swollen" domestic and
foreign demands. The demands, ofcourse, were
themselves swollen bythe rapid increase in money
financing, which caused the money supply to rise
by 30 percent.
Accountability
It was clear from the outset that the Congress
intended the Federal Reserve System to remain
accountable to it, notwithstanding the provision
for appointment ofthe members ofthe Federal
Reserve Board bythe President. (Originally ap-
pointed for staggered lO-year terms, Board
members' terms were increased by the Congress
to 12 years in 1933 and then to 14 years in 1935
specifically to provide them with greater insulation
from influence bythe Executive Branch. For the
same reason, the Congress in 1935 removed the
Secretaryofthe Treasury and the Comptrollerfrom
ex officio membership on the Board.)
Early in 1914, the Attorney General ruled thatthe
Federal Reserve Board was an "independentBoard
or Governmentestablishment" and nota Bureau
or division ofthe Treasury (where the Board was
housed), "establishment" being defined by the
U.S. Code as an entity in the Executive branch.
Another expression ofCongressional intent as to
whom the Federal Reserve Board was accountable
was the requirementthatthe Board annuallymake
afuII written reportofits operationstothe Speaker
ofthe House"forthe information oftheCongress,"
which report would establish a "direct relationship
between the Board and the Congress."
Cornerstone of independence
The Federal Reserve Act and subsequent amend-
ments also gave control overthe classification and
compensation of Federal Reserve employees to
the new System (except for the salaries ofBoard
members, which are set byCongress), and exemp-
ted both the Federal Reserve Board and the Reserve
Banks from the congressional appropriations pro-
cess. Atthe same time, the Federal Reserve Act
stipulated that all System earnings in excess of
expenses be paid to the Treasury. Overthe entire
period from 1914-1983, System payments to the
Treasury have totalled $128 billion, representingalmost 90 percent ofthe System's gross income
(largely earnings on its investment portfolio). This
aspect ofthe Fed's finances underscores the public
and governmental, rather than the private, nature
ofthe Reserve Banks and the System.
Even in the cornerstone of its "independence"-its
financial self-sufficiency, a set ofchecks and
balances has been built in. The Federal Reserve
System never has been entirely free from auditof
its expenditures. In his 1914 ruling, in which he
determined thatthe Federal Reserve Board was an
"independentgovernment establishment" and
not part ofthe Treasury, the Attorney General also
concluded that the funds derived bythe Board
from its assessments on the Reserve Banks (the
Board's source offunds) were "public monies"
used to pay public officials and therefore were
subject to audit by the Treasury. Following the
establishmentofthe General Accounting Office
(GAO) in 1921, theCornptrollercited the Attorney
General's 1914 ruling as abasis forauditingBoard
funds, which itdid until 1933 when the Congress
amended the Federal Reserve Actexplicitly to
preclude audit ofthe Board (and the Reserve
Banks) bythe GAO. However, the Board became
subjecttoauditby nationallyknown, independent
auditfirms, while the Reserve Banks were them-
selves subject to audit bythe Board.
Morecurrently, the Federal BankingAgencyAudit
Actof1978provided for auditbytheGAOofeach
ofthe federal banking agencies, includingthe
Board ofGovernors, the Reserve Banks and their
branches, butwith some carefuIlydefinedexemp-
tions. These included the necessarily confidential
and highlysensitive areas ofmonetarypolicy, open
marketoperations,and transactions conducted on
behalfof, orwith, foreign governments and central
banks. In such ways, Congress continually recog-
nizes and reaffirms the importanceof maintaining
the Federal Reserve's independence within
government.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)











Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 183,961 321 7,936 5.4
Loans and Leases1 6 165,296 346 9,941 7.7
Commercial and Industrial 49,894 263 3,931 10.3
Real estate 61,119 33 2,220 4.5
Loans to Individuals 30,407 92 3,756 17.0
Leases 5,051 2 - 12 - 0.2
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,548 - 66 - 959 - 9.2
Other Securities2 7,117 41 - 1,046 - 15.4
Total Deposits 189,466 - 774 - 1,531 - 0.9
Demand Deposits 43,339 -1,055 - 5,898 - 14.4
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 29,281 - 408 - 2,050 - 7.9
OtherTransaction Balances4 12,037 - 275 - 738 - 6.9
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 134,091 557 5,106 4.7
Money Mark~tDeposit
Accounts-Total 38,486 452 - 1,111 - 3.3
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 41,434 174 3,269 10.3
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 20,235 1,448 - 2,772 - 14.5
Weekly Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+J/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading accountsecurities
3 Excludes U.S. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
s Includes borrowing via FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items not shown separately